On the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Anton said the nuclear weapons base he was serving at was on full alert.
“Before that, we only had drills. But the day the war broke out, the weapons were fully in place,” says the former officer of the Russian nuclear forces. “We were prepared to launch forces into the sea and into the air and, in theory, carry out a nuclear strike.”
I met Anton in a secret location outside Russia. For its own protection, the BBC will not reveal where. We also changed his name and didn’t show his face.
Anton was an officer at a top-secret nuclear weapons facility in Russia.
He showed us documents confirming his unit, rank and base.
The BBC is unable to independently verify all of the events he described, although they agree with Russian statements at the time.
The former officer (left) spoke to the BBC at a secret location – his face was blurred to hide his identity (BBC)
Three days after troops crossed Ukraine’s borders, Vladimir Putin announced that Russian nuclear deterrent forces had been deployed. ordered into a “special mode of combat duty”.
Anton claims that combat alert was in place from the first day of the war and claims that his unit was “locked inside the base.”
“All we had was Russian state television,” says the former officer. “I didn’t really know what it all meant. I automatically performed my duties. We weren’t fighting in the war, we were just keeping the nuclear weapons.”
The state of alert was lifted, he adds, after two to three weeks.
Anton’s testimony offers insight into the top-secret inner workings of Russia’s nuclear forces. It is extremely rare for soldiers to speak to journalists.
“There is a very strict selection process there. Everyone is a professional soldier – no conscripts,” he explains.
“There are constant checks and lie detector tests for everyone. The pay is much higher and troops are not sent to war. They are there either to push back or to carry out a nuclear strike.”
The former officer says life was tightly controlled.
“It was my responsibility to ensure that the soldiers under my command did not take any phones with the nuclear base,” he explains.
“It’s a closed society, there are no foreigners there. If you want your parents to visit you, you must make a request three months in advance to the FSB security service.”
Anton was part of the base security unit, a quick reaction force that guarded nuclear weapons.
“We had constant training exercises. Our reaction time was two minutes,” he says with a touch of pride.
Russia has about 4,380 operational nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists, but only 1,700 are “deployed” or ready for use. All NATO member states combined have a similar number.
There are also concerns about whether Putin might choose to deploy “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, often called tactics. These are smaller missiles that generally do not cause widespread radioactive fallout.
Their use would nevertheless lead to a dangerous escalation of the war.
The Kremlin is doing everything in its power to test the nerves of the West.
Just last week, Putin ratified changes to nuclear doctrine – the official rules dictating how and when Russia can launch nuclear weapons.
The doctrine now states that Russia can launch missiles if it comes under a “massive attack” by conventional missiles by a non-nuclear state, but “with the participation or support of a nuclear state.”
Russian officials say the updated doctrine “effectively eliminates” the possibility of battlefield defeat.
But is Russia’s nuclear arsenal fully functional?
Some Western experts have suggested its weapons mostly date from the Soviet era and may not even work.
The former nuclear force officer rejected this advice, calling it “a very simplified view of so-called experts.”
“There may be outdated types of weapons in some regions, but the country has a huge nuclear arsenal, a huge amount of nuclear warheads, as well as constant combat patrols on land, sea and in the air.”
Russian nuclear weapons are fully operational and combat ready, he said. “The work to maintain nuclear weapons is carried out constantly, it never stops, even for a minute.”
Shortly after the start of the full-scale war, Anton said he received what he describes as a “criminal order”: to lecture his troops using very specific written directives.
“They said that Ukrainian civilians are fighters and must be destroyed!” » he exclaims. “It’s a red line for me: it’s a war crime. I said I would not spread this propaganda.
Senior officers reprimanded Anton by transferring him to a regular assault brigade in another part of the country. He was told he would be sent to war.
These units are often sent into combat as the “first wave” and a number of Russian defectors have told the BBC that “troublemakers” who oppose the war have been used as “cannon fodder”.
The Russian embassy in London did not respond to a request for comment.
Before he could be sent to the front, Anton signed a declaration refusing to participate in the war and a criminal case was opened against him. He showed us documents confirming his transfer to the assault brigade and details of the criminal case.
He then decides to flee the country with the help of a voluntary organization for deserters.
“If I had fled the nuclear base, the local FSB security service would have reacted decisively and I probably would not have been able to leave the country,” he said.
But he believes that because he was transferred to a regular assault brigade, the high-level security clearance system failed.
Anton said he wanted the world to know that many Russian soldiers were against the war.
The voluntary organization that helps deserters, “Idite Lesom” (“Go through the forest”, in English, or “Get Lost”), told the BBC that the number of deserters seeking help had increased at 350 per month.
The risks for those who flee are also increasing. At least one deserter was killed after fleeing abroad, and there were several cases of men being forcibly returned to Russia and put on trial.
Although Anton has left Russia, he says security services are still wanted there: “Here I take precautions, I work informally and I don’t appear in any official system.”
He said he stopped talking to his friends about the nuclear base because he could put them in danger: “They have to take lie detector tests, and any contact with me could lead to a criminal case.” »
But he has no illusions about the risk he himself runs by helping other soldiers flee.
“I understand that the more I do this, the more likely it is that they will try to kill me.”
