If, due to the disqualification of Members under Article 48, their disability or their death, the Prime Minister loses his majority in the House before the next general election, the solution should be as provided in Article 43 (4): the resignation of the Prime Minister. , or a request to the monarch for early dissolution.
These will trigger the monarch’s broad discretion to accept or refuse the request for dissolution or to ask the incumbent to remain interim until the monarch succeeds in appointing a coalition, unity or minority government.
The law should make a clear and rational distinction between “ceasing to be a member” (which results in a vacancy) and being “removed from office” (which does not result in a vacancy of the seat).
The political and financial rewards of defection must also be removed, including preventing a defecting MP, even if re-elected, from holding a Cabinet position or any remunerative position in government, statutory bodies and GLCs for the rest of the legislature.
Indeed, Malaysia should emulate India by amending the Constitution to limit the number of federal ministerial and deputy ministerial positions to a maximum of 50. It is worth noting that almost all state constitutions, including Johor’s, cap the number of Cabinet positions. The Federal Constitution should be inspired by the state constitutions on this point.
In the coming decades, a true political coalition will likely become the norm. The political influence of Sabah and Sarawak will continue to grow, and their restrictive role in the peninsula’s identity politics may become effective.
A resurgent monarchy can also help provide new directions and moderate extremism. In this environment, better legal controls on political parties are necessary.
Shad Saleem Faruqi is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore; and Tunku Abdul Rahman Chair, University of Malaysia. This comment appeared for the first time on ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute Blog, Fulcrum.